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There is no doubt that the enlargement of the EU to 
now include 28 member states can be seen as the 
most successful exercise in preventive diplomacy 
and projection of political stability, democratic 
peace and economic prosperity since the Roman 
Empire. The downside of this success story of Euro-
pean Union enlargement, however, is that it has 
complicated the relationship between the EU and 
Russia and has led, step-by-step, to a political 
destabilization on the eastern boundaries of the EU. 
In this respect, the Eastern Partnership initiative, 
launched by the European Union in 2008 to cover 
the eastern dimension of its already existing Euro-
pean Neighborhood Policy was a major turning 
point. Prior to the Eastern Partnership Summit in 
Vilnius in late November 2013, Russia exerted inten-
se pressure on its neighborhood states not to accept 
the EU’s initiative and it was successful in the case 
of Ukraine. At the Vilnius summit, Ukrainian Presi-
dent Yanukovich refused to sign an Association 
Agreement with the EU. His decision not to sign the 
Agreement led to violent public protests in Kiev 
which culminated in President Yanukovich’s over-
throw on February 22, 2014. As a result, Russia 
invaded and annexed the Crimean peninsula and 
actively supported pro-Russian separatist forces 
fighting the Ukrainian army in a bloody and violent 
conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine (Larsen 2014).
All these events, taking most Western government 
officials by surprise, represent a major geopolitical 
shock to the Post Cold War European Security order. 
While slowing down the European Union’s initiati-
ves on Eastern Partnership for the time being, the 
crisis over Ukraine also calls for an urgent reassess-
ment of the underlying political discourses on 
Europe as an international actor shaping the Euro-
pean Union’s attempts to promote the political and 
economic integration and/or association of its 
eastern neighbours: particularly influential in this 
context has been conception of the EU as a “civilian” 
or “normative” power.
The EU as a “civilian power” in international 
politics
There is a widespread consensus in the European 
political as well as academic discourse that the 
European Union plays a distinctive role in internati-
onal politics (Hyde-Price 2008). The idea that the EU 
is a distinctive, qualitatively new and better interna-
tional actor was first outlined by François Duchêne 
in the early 1970’s when he referred to the EU as an 
“example of a new stage in political civilization. The 
European Community in particular would have a 
chance to demonstrate the [international, M.M.] 
influence which can be wielded by a large political 
cooperative formed to exert essentially civilian 
forms of power” (Duchêne 1973, 19). This is often 
(critically) compared to the USA’s (international) 
policy based on classical tools, including the usage 
of military power.  Since the European Community  is 
a “civilian group of countries with a long history of 
economic power and relatively short on armed 
force” (ibd., 20), it has a fundamental interest in 
trying to domesticate relations between states. 
From the perspective of the domestication of inter-
national relations, “civilian powers” like the EU  
essentially pursue the following aims (Harnisch/-
Maull 2001, 4):
- Constraining the use of force through cooperation 
and collective security arrangements;
- Strengthening the rule of law through multilateral 
cooperation, integration and partial transfer of 
sovereignty;
- Promoting democracy and human rights within 
and between states.
It is quite obvious that this list of “civilian aims” 
reflects to a very large extent the political structure 
and values upon which the European Union is built 
on. Because of its unique and innovative internal 
political and institutional structure, the EU has no 
other choice but to project these principles and 
norms in its external relations. For the EU, acting as 
a “force for good” in international relations is the 
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compelling consequence of the internal logic of the 
European integration process (Orbie 2006, 125-126). 
Not surprisingly, the academic discourse on EU as a 
“civilian” power has been favourably received by the 
European political establishment. Central elements 
of the “civilian power” concept can be found in 
various official EU documents and speeches of EU 
officials. The most comprehensive and most clear 
document on the European Union’s identity as an 
international actor however is the European Securi-
ty Strategy of 2003 entitled “A secure Europe in a 
better world” which is a “well-written description of 
the EU’s role concept as civilian force” in world 
politics (Maull 2005, 792).
It is in the context of this European political and 
academic discourse on the EU’s international identi-
ty that the enlargement process as well as the 
Eastern Partnership Initiative gain its specific mea-
ning. From the perspective of the “civilian power” 
discourse, both the enlargement process as well as 
the Partnership Initiative were and still are all about 
transferring and diffusing the EU’s internal values 
and norms to the states of Central and Eastern 
Europe allowing a post-national order to replace the 
logic of power politics that governed this part of 
Europe until the end of the Cold War. The transfor-
mative power of the EU was based for the most part, 
if not exclusively on its own distinctive polity and its 
influence on the Central and Eastern European 
states, stemming not from what the EU does, but 
what it is (Manners 2008).
However a “civilian” or “normative power” driven 
enlargement process of the EU has serious downsi-
des. First of all, from this perspective the enlarge-
ment of the EU cannot be anything other than 
open-ended, lending the project - in fact – a univer-
sal nature. Since the purpose of civilizing internatio-
nal relations exclusively based on the norms and 
principles outlined above has a global and/or 
universal dimension, the geographical limitation of 
EU enlargement is to a large extent excluded. 
Moreover, the open-ended nature of the enlarge-
ment process is one of the key factors in preserving 
the EU’s legitimacy to promote its norms and values 
beyond its boundaries. As has been pointed out by a 
Finnish analyst, the EU’s attempts to divorce its 
normative power from the accession process run the 
risk of being counterproductive. Therefore, the 
Eastern Partnership Initiative represents both the 
avoidance and the continuation of enlargement by 
other means (Haukkala 2008), being an instrument 
designed both to let the partner states in and to 
keep them out. To summarize, both the EU’s enlar-
gement policy and its Partnership Initiative seem to 
end up as a form of “soft imperialism” since each 
enlargement round creates new boundaries beyond 
which the European Norms and values have to be 
imposed if the EU wants to counter the concerns 
over the “fortress Europe” idea (Haukkala 2008).
It is obvious that this “imperial logic” inherent in 
the “civilian power” concept has a strong potential 
for conflict when third powers perceive EU’s strate-
gies on its eastern boundaries as a zero-sum game 
and are determined enough to loudly articulate this 
perception as well as strong enough to undertake 
counteractions. And this is exactly what happened 
in the case of Ukraine when Russia very quickly 
developed a hostile zero-sum attitude to the EU’s 
growing influence in this region as a result of the 
Eastern Partnership initiative. This hostile zero-sum 
attitude has been furhter intensified by the fact that 
major member states like Germany have shown, at 
least up to now, little understanding for Russia’s 
interests in containing the EU because they perceive 
the latter as an inherently benign civilian power 
(Larsen 2014, 17). Since the “civilian power” concept 
rests on the assumption that there are cosmopoli-
tan norms and values which transcend the particu-
lar or even rival claims of states or other political 
entities, the eastward expansion of the EU might 
never be seen by the EU as a threat to Russia. On the 
contrary, any opposition to further initiatives to 
promote the “European project” further eastward 
might be perceived as a threat to the EU’s vision of 
establishing a post-national order in Europe based 
on democratic values, international harmony and 
effective multilateralism. From this perspective 
there is no other way for the European Union other 
than to “punish” recalcitrant opponents like Russia. 
“Punishing” Russia by imposing ever increasing 
sanctions, as carried out by the EU in the recent 
past, is an extremely dangerous and conflict prone 
strategy because it makes an already bad situation 
even worse (Mearsheimer 2014). 
With this perspective in mind, the fundamental 
problem with the EU’s foreign policy in general and 
its eastern policy in particular becomes very clear: 
the European Union still clings to a “civilian” model 
of international relations which relies on the promo-
tion of norms and values and explicitly eschews 
traditional power politics while at the same time the 






rent role model that bears directly on the anarchic 
structure of the international system. A brief excur-
sus on geopolitics and geopolitical models of the 
European Union might further develop this assess-
ment of the civilian power concept as being largely 
inappropriate for the EU to cope with the challenges 
emanating from international politics.
Geopolitics and geopolitical models of the European 
Union – changing paradigms and perceptions
The concept of the EU as a “civilian power” has been 
implemented under the very specific political-terri-
torial conditions of post-Cold War Europe. They 
were characterized by an absence of strong compe-
ting centers of integration in the neighborhood after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Consequently the 
expansion of the EU was based on structuring its 
internal and external borders according to one of 
four strategies: networked (non)border, march, coloni-
al frontier and limes (Browning and Joenniemi 2008). 
In the case of a networked (non)border, state bounda-
ries were gradually eroding together with free flows 
of people and goods, which was coordinated by 
numerous local centers. A march corresponds with a 
buffer zone (Browning and Joenniemi, 2008, p. 527; 
Walters, 2004), a colonial frontier is a line, constantly 
pushed forward and separating asymmetric structu-
res. The line itself is one dimensionally permeable, 
with norms and values being transferred from a 
more developed partner to the less advanced one. A 
limes represents a final border, however also separa-
ting asymmetric structures (Browning and Joennie-
mi, 2008, p. 529; Walters, 2004). In the practice of 
EUrope structuring its borders, it seems that the 
networked (non)border has been applied in the case of 
western European non-member states, limes for 
Mediterranean neighbors. The continental east was 
seen as colonial frontier, that was to replace march.
However the considerations outlined above reveal 
even more – they give a more general picture of the 
geopolitical model of the EU. Christopher Browning 
and Pertti Joenniemi (2008) identify three of them: 
Westphalian, imperial and neomedieval. The first 
one has a clearly determined space, enclosed within 
precisely designed state(-like) boundaries. The 
center controls the entire territory on a basis of the 
equal exercising of norms, values and laws. In the 
case of the European Union one can see it as a 
semi-state structure (Caporaso, 1996), with defined 
territory marked and protected by the external 
boundary (Schengen boundary), acquis communau-
taire being here the legal base for the whole territory 
and the new political center taking over powers and 
responsibilities from the member states (Browning 
and Joenniemi, 2008, pp. 522-526).  The second 
assumes that the center and peripheries can be 
identified, with the former producing ideas and 
solutions transferred to the latter. The further from 
the center, the weaker the influence is. The center is 
consequently surrounded by circles of a concentric 
character. Both the enlargements and external 
involvement illustrate this model in the case of the 
EU (Zielonka, 2007), with the European Neighbor-
hood Policy as an example (Browning and Joennie-
mi, 2008, pp. 522-526).   The neomedieval model 
assumes there is no single dominating center, and 
several regional and local functionally networked 
centers can be identified (Wind, 2003).
The territorially and normatively expansive charac-
ter of the EU allows us to classify it as the  imperial 
model (Zielonka, 2007). Consequently the logic of 
concentric circles can be applied, where the very 
core is made up of the most integrated (institutio-
nally and non-institutionally) group of member 
states. The further away from the core, the less 
intensive the participation in the integration project 
(Comelli, Greco, Tocci, 2007). Outer circles conse-
quently reveal those areas not participating in the 
euro zone, the Schengen zone,  further away the 
non-member candidates,  then potential candida-
tes, and finally the partner states.
The dynamics illustrated here have at least three 
significant consequences for understanding the 
Eastern policies of the EU. First of all, it is the expan-
ding character of the EU project, following the 
neo-functional linearity (Lindberg, 1963) of territori-
al and functional spill over. It is attracting (and is 
trying to attract) more and more states located 
further and further from the original center. Conse-
quently the EU has been growing in size. But the 
newly ‘absorbed’ territories’ link to the center dimi-
nishes the further they are away from the center. 
Secondly, the borders of the European project are 
much wider than the borders of the EU, representing 
in addition more of a frontier scheme than a 
boundary one. They are often fuzzy and undefined, 
with constantly changing locations, further and 
further away. The geostrategy of a colonial frontier 
describes its character in the eastern part of the 
continent, with neighboring states as an expansion 
space. Here the EU, as the normative power, exports 






developing the outer circles. Thirdly, both academic 
reflection and the political practice of the European 
project have been strongly Europe-centric. For over 
two decades they have assumed (directly or indirec-
tly) that the EU is a dominating (or even a single 
existing) project in this part of the world, represen-
ting a kind of civilized space  surrounded by ‘barbari-
an’ territories. This perception resulted from econo-
mic (high GDP) and political (liberal democracy) 
asymmetries, but also from a lack of alternative 
‘gravity centers’ located in the neighborhood. 
Consequently, the European project was treated and 
developed as if surrounded by ‘no man’s land,’ 
expanding almost without limit towards the outer 
spaces.
However this Europe-centric perspective was 
undermined by the “recovery” of Russia and her 
attempt to reconstruct her own empire in the 2010s. 
Consequently the conflict in Ukraine can be seen as 
an outcome of the overlapping influences of two 
competing centers: Brussels and Moscow. Both are 
exporting their projects to the neighboring territo-
ries, creating outer circles.  Ukraine is consequently 
a frontier for both sides, a space where the political, 
economic and cultural influences of Brussels and 
Moscow are penetrating and overlap. This situation 
has been acceptable for both sides until recently, 
motivated however by various factors: The EU, tired 
with the 2004/7/13 big bang, was not able to offer 
very close relations, for example membership, to its 
eastern neighbors. At the same time Russia had 
(almost) no means or resources to prevent Ukraine 
from implementing its western orientation. The 
treatment of Ukraine as a form of colonial frontier 
meant that in practice it became a sort of march, 
geopolitically separating both parties.
But the 2013 Eastern Partnership Vilnius Summit 
created a situation where both projects  suddenly 
became mutually exclusive. The signing of the asso-
ciation agreement would mean further expansion of 
the EU, colliding with the Russian offer of the Eurasi-
an Economic Union. The previous forms of influence 
tolerated frontier borders (or even march), the new 
one was based on an either-or principle. This had to 
lead to the (re)boundarization of the border 
between the European project and the Russian project. 
The question has been where it is to be located (the 
cause of the territorial disputes) and how is it going 
to be settled (confronting the EU’s normative power 
with the Russian form of intervention which follows 
a traditional means of power)?
The line of argument presented above makes it 
necessary to redefine the nature of both projects. 
The exclusivity and the potential for conflict corres-
ponds much better with the Westphalian model 
(Caporaso, 1996), also with regard to the instru-
ments of external policies. Both structures cannot 
go on expanding indefinitely, blocking each other 
territorially, but also politically, economically, and – 
in the case of Russia - militarily. The overlapping of 
influences is no longer an option, a boundary 
between both structures has to be established. 
Consequently Ukraine can belong either to the Euro-
pean project, or the Russian project. This can include 
its entire territory or can alternatively lead to its 
disintegration. In any case one can expect the 
geostrategy of limes being applied by both sides, 
with the  new boundary being “final” for them. This 
opens – together with the previously debated 
criticism of the civilian power concept – a window of 
opportunity for a neo-realist perspective.
The (neo-) realist perspective – an alternative?
The basic tenet of the neo-realist or structural 
realist perspective on is that the pressures stem-
ming from the international system “shape” and 
“shove” the behavior of states without completely 
determining this behavior. The structure of the 
international system is – in principle – anarchic. 
Anarchy here is by no means chaos – it simply means 
that states as sovereign entities are formally equal 
with each other and are not subordinated to a higher 
authority which has a system wide law making and 
law enforcing authority. Therefore, international 
politics have no authority bound by law and there is 
no international police force to rely on. It is rather a 
realm in which states have to figure out by themsel-
ves how they want to live with each other, how they 
are to manage their relationship and ultimately how 
they are going to manage their security concerns as 
well as their own survival as a sovereign entity. So 
far, international politics can be described as a realm 
of self-help or as a self-help system. Given the anar-
chic structure of the international system, some 
degree of security competition especially between 
the great powers is persistent and – more important 
– inevitable. Balancing and the strong tendency of 
shaping the international environment conducive to 
their own strategic interests and preferences has 
become the dominant feature of great power beha-
vior. (Waltz 1979, 78-128).











international politics cannot be seen primarily as an 
exporter of norms and values, but as a collective 
actor whose primary concern is to secure its survival 
under the conditions of international anarchy. To 
this end, the European Union serves three main 
purposes for its member states:
1. It serves as an instrument to preserve and promo-
te the international economic competiveness of its 
member states in the light of the challenges of 
globalization.
2. It serves as instrument for the EU member states 
to meet the geopolitical challenges.
3. It serves as an instrument for collectively shaping 
the European Union’s regional international 
environment according to its own political, econo-
mic and security interests (Hyde-Price 2006, 222).
The latter purpose become increasingly prominent 
in the early 1990s when the European Union’s 
well-being was threatened by the prospect of politi-
cal instability and economic crisis within the 
post-communist Central and Eastern European 
states. And it is these international pressures which 
have led the EU to gradually shape its regional inter-
national environment, establishing a blend of impo-
sed and negotiated order in its neighboring territo-
ries. Far from being a “civilian” or “normative 
power”, the European Union’s transformative 
power in Central and Eastern Europe was based on 
its economic clout, the fear of exclusion from its 
attractive economic market and the promise of 
future membership (Hyde-Price 2008, 31). Therefo-
re, by projecting stability into its eastern regional 
environment in this specific way, the European 
Union acquired the classical role of an ordering 
power on the European continent (Hyde-Price 2006, 
226).
If the EU acknowledges its role as that of a Europe-
an ordering power rather than clinging to the 
self-image of being an exporter of values and norms 
in international politics, it would not only mean that 
the agenda outlined above of a “civilian power” 
would be seriously constrained by the structural 
pressures of the self-help system. It would also 
allow it to design the eastern enlargement process 
of the European Union as a clearly defined geogra-
phical project whose boundaries would largely 
depend for a large part upon the degree of security 
competition between the EU and Russia. Both the 
European Union and Russia have – as Hedley Bull 
has already pointed out in his seminal analysis of 
the role of great powers in an anarchical society – a 
special obligation to dampen their security competi-
tion in order to preserve and promote a stable and 
peaceful international order (Bull 1977, pp 200). 
Accepting a role model inspired by neo-realist logic 
would allow the EU to tone down its “civilian 
power” discourse while at the same time being 
better primed to resolve great power conflicts on 
the basis of reciprocity!
Conclusion
It has been argued in this paper that the “civilian” or 
“normative power” model which is shaping the EU’s 
efforts towards the political and economic integrati-
on or association of its eastern neighbours is not 
only for the most part inefficient but is also prone to 
conflict when it comes to the management of 
boundary problems related with this process.  A 
brief excursus on the geopolitical models of the 
European Union supports this assessment. In cont-
rast to the “civilian power” model, by recognizing 
that there are enduring security competition and 
rival interests between states given the anarchic 
structure of the international system, the neorealist 
perspective opens up space for compromise and – at 
least – a partial resolution of conflicts.
However, even if there is some virtue in the neorea-
list argument in this context, there is a strong 
indication that the challenges of managing the 
boundary problems related to the European Union’s 
eastern policy will become increasingly detrimental 
to the core values on which the European Union is 
based on – democracy, the rule of law, transforming 
the notion of sovereignty, eschewing and rejecting 
traditional power politics. If the European Union is 
not be able to reconcile in its foreign policy the com-
peting logic of being a “civilian power” (which is of 
crucial importance for the success of the European 
integration process itself) with the logic of interna-
tional anarchy, it runs the risk of ending up as a 
tragic international actor finding itself on a highway 
to hell. To find a viable exit from this highway will 
constitute an immediate challenge for the European 
Union’s credibility and legitimacy as a serious inter-
national actor!
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